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KEITH S. ROSENN
Brazil's New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient
Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society
INTRODUCTION
After more than two decades of authoritarian military rule,
Brazil has finally completed its incredibly slow transition from dic-
tatorship to democratic government.' On November 15, 1989 the en-
tire Brazilian electorate,2 in contradistinction to one restricted to
generals or legislators, had its first opportunity in 29 years to vote
directly for a presidential candidate. Because none of the 21 candi-
dates received a majority, a runoff election was held on December
17, 1989; it resulted in the election of Fernando Collor de Mello, a
populist 40-year old former governor of the small northern state of
Alagoas. The election was held pursuant to Brazil's new Constitu-
tion, which provided the critical framework for restoration of full
democracy. In this respect, the Constitution worked well. Although
the elections were hotly contested, no one seriously contests the le-
gitimacy of Collor's presidential mandate.
The new Constitution is Brazil's seventh or eighth constitution,
depending upon whether one counts a constitutional amendment
that redrafted the entire constitution as a new constitution or as an
KEITH S. ROSENN is Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. The process began in 1974 with the gradual liberalization of military regimes.
Tancredo Neves, who was elected indirectly by the electoral college in January 1985,
would have been the first civilian president in 21 years had he not died shortly
before assuming office. On March 15, 1989, the Vice President, Jos6 Sarney, was
sworn in as Brazil's transitional president. The length of the mandate of Brazil's
"accidental president" was the subject of a bitter and costly dispute in the Constitu-
ent Assembly, which ultimately decided that Sarney's mandate would not terminate
until March 15, 1990. The story of this transition is recounted in Mainwaring, "The
Transition to Democracy in Brazil," in Brazil's Economic and Political Future 168
(Julian Chacel, Pamela Falk & David Fleischer eds. 1988).
2. The electorate was expanded to include for the first time persons between
the ages of 16 and 18. Const. of 1988, art. 14 § 10 11 (c). Illiterates, a group that in-
cluded more than 30 percent of the population at the last census, were enfranchised
by Constitutional Amendment No. 25 of May 15, 1985. Military conscripts, however,
remain disenfranchised during the period of their obligatory military service. Const.
of 1988, art. 14 § 2°. Voting is optional for those between the ages of 16 and 18, those
over 70, and illiterates; it is obligatory for all others. Id., art. 14 § 1.
During the last popular presidential election, held in 1960, fewer than 12 million
persons voted. During the runoff presidential election in December 1989, 55,492,560
votes were cast, equivalent to 67.61 percent of the total electorate. Gazeta Mercantil,
Dec. 19, 1989 at 1.
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amendment.3 It replaces the 1969 Constitution, promulgated by the
three ministers of the Armed Forces pursuant to authority the mili-
tary conferred upon itself by a series of Institutional Acts, and
whose legitimacy was decidedly dubious.4 The 1969 Constitution,
like its 1967 predecessor, was designed to institutionalize a de facto
military regime and to insure its survival. One of its basic features
was centralization of power. It transferred a considerable amount of
power from the states and municipalities to the federal government,
leaving Brazilian federalism a shadow of its former self. Although
formally providing for a tripartite division of power among the exec-
utive, legislative, and judicial branches, a substantial amount of leg-
islative power was transferred to the Executive. Moreover, both the
Legislature and Judiciary were purged of elements whom the mili-
tary deemed insufficiently sympathetic to the goals of the 1964
Revolution.5
The period preceding promulgation of the 1969 Constitution was
one of constant crisis resulting from widespread opposition to the
military government. The government responded by issuing a series
of 12 Institutional Acts that continuously modified the 1967 Consti-
tution in accordance with the military command's assessment of the
needs of the moment. A constitution that can be modified by the
government's unilateral declaration that it has decided to utilize a
self-proclaimed ambulatory constituent power is, like the Emperor's
new clothes, only a transparent disguise for naked power. In 1972,
3. Brazil's prior constitutions are: (1) the Constitution of 1824, which estab-
lished a constitutional monarchy; (2) the Constitution of 1891, which established a
republican government; (3) the Constitution of 1934, which institutionalized the Sec-
ond Republic following the 1930 Revolution; (4) the Constitution of 1937, which in-
stitutionalized the dictatorship of Getilio Vargas; (5) the Constitution of 1946, which
restored democracy after the ouster of Vargas; (6) the Constitution of 1967, which
institutionalized the military regime that came to power in 1964; and (7) the Consti-
tution of 1969, issued technically as Amendment N ° 1 to the 1967 Constitution, but
which revised and renumbered the entire text as a matter of form, while making rel-
atively few important substantive changes. Some authors regard this a new constitu-
tion; others treat it as merely an amendment of the 1967 Constitution. See Orlando
Soares, Comentdrios d Constituiqdo da Reptiblica Federativa do Brasil 84-86 (3d ed.
1990). Here the 1969 Amendment is treated as a new constitution. The constitu-
tional texts, along with an index, are collected in the two-volume compilation of the
Senado Federal, Constituiq6es do Brasil (1986). For brief descriptions of Brazil's
constitutions, see Alves, "Constituig6es do Brasil," Rev. Dir. Const. e Ciencia Pol. 1
(NiLmero Especial 1987); Coelho, "Brasil de Muitas Constituig6es," in 0 Processo
Constituinte 1987-1988, 23 (Milton Guran ed. 1988).
4. An institutional act is an expression of the constituent power exercised by a
successful revolution. The theoretical explanation for the legitimacy of this exercise
of power is contained in the Preambles to the First and Second Institutional Acts,
translated in Kenneth Karst & Keith Rosenn, Law and Development in Latin
American 205-208 (1975).
5. See Karst & Rosenn, supra n. 4 at 214-215; Skidmore, "Politics and Economic
Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1937-71," in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins,
Policies, and Future 3, 6-11, 38-41 (Alfred Stepan ed. 1973).
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Professor Riordan Roett concluded, with considerable justification,
that the military's commitment to constitutionalism was basically
cosmetic.6
THE CONVOLUTED PROCESS OF DRAFTING THE NEW CONSTITUTION
The notion that the military lacked any serious commitment to
constitutionalism became gradually less tenable during the 1974-1985
phase of political liberalization known as distensdo (liberalization),
when the most authoritarian features of the military regimes were
eventually relaxed by subsequent constitutional amendments. 7
Nonetheless, most Brazilians felt that a democratic Brazil ought to
be governed by a new constitution. During his campaign, President-
elect Neves promised a new constitution, and Sarney, his Vice-Presi-
dent and successor, resolved to fulfill that promise. Unfortunately,
the birth of the new constitution was poorly conceived. Instead of
convoking a separate constituent assembly, President Sarney pro-
posed a constitutional amendment, which Congress adopted, empow-
ering the next Congress to serve as a constituent assembly.8
The decision to have the new Congress double as a constituent
assembly was an unfortunate mistake for several reasons. First, it
was politically unfair because the next Congress included 23 sena-
tors elected in 1982 under the prior authoritarian regime's electoral
legislation, which under-represented the more liberal parts of the
country. These senators had no specific mandate to serve as part of
a constituent assembly.9 Moreover, the Congressional election was
held just before the electorate realized how badly it had been
deceived by Sarney's Cruzado Plan, a wage increase/price freeze
that created the illusion of monetary stability and relative prosper-
ity, but did nothing to eliminate the underlying causes of the soaring
6. Professor Roett wrote:
"It seems clear that the military feel the need to preserve the myth of con-
stitutionalism that has marked Brazilian history in both the 19th and 20th
centuries. It is also clear that the military regime feels little compunction
in violating both the spirit and the letter of the constitution when it is
deemed necessary in the interests of the Revolution. Thus, the Institutional
Acts represent the reality of the 1964 movement in that they are authorita-
tive statements of the regime's political purpose; the constitution remains a
legal exercise that is retained because it signifies so little in reality. It is a
juridical statement of intent, not a political statement of relevance to the
governance of the Brazilian state." Roett, "A Praetorian Army in Politics:
The Changing Role of the Brazilian Military," in Brazil in the Sixties 3, 27
(Riordan Roett ed. 1972).
7. For a concise description of the evolution of the 1969 Constitution up to 1985,
see Manoel Gongalves Ferreira Filho, Comentdrios d Constituiqdo Brasileira 28-38
(6th ed. 1986).
8. Constitutional Amendment No. 26 of November 27, 1985.
9. At its second session, the Constituent Assembly decided to permit these 23
senators to vote in the Constituent Assembly.
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inflation it had temporarily suppressed. 0 Had the election been
held after the badly disillusioned electorate realized that the Cru-
zado Plan was a fiasco, and that the country was in the grip of the
worst inflationary crisis in Brazilian history, it is doubtful that the
government's party, the PMDB, would have been able to elect a ma-
jority of the seats in the new Congress." Second, from a functional
standpoint, combining normal legislative powers and constitution-
making powers in the same body made no sense, for the two func-
tions interfered with each other. Congress is a highly political body
with a short-term perspective and agenda. Constitutions should be
elaborated by statesmen with a long-term and nonpartisan perspec-
tive. As a basic political player, Congress had a clear conflict of in-
terests. It is not surprising that the constitutional document it
drafted aggrandized Congressional power at the expense of other in-
stitutions and conferred numerous favors upon special interest
groups.
If there were any truth to the old canard that a camel is a horse
drafted by a committee, the new Brazilian Constitution would re-
semble a hydra-headed Pegasus. On September 3, 1985, President
Sarney appointed a group of fifty "notables," called the Afonso Ari-
nos Commission, to prepare the first draft of the Constitution. The
Arinos Commission's draft, however, was far too liberal for the con-
servative Sarney, who refused to submit it to Congress for considera-
tion.12 The Constituent Assembly then considered the question of
whether to commission a draft constitution and firmly rejected the
idea as a "dangerous instrument of control over the Assembly.'ai
The basic drafting was undertaken from scratch by the entire 559-
member Congress, which divided itself into eight committees, each
made up of 63 regular members and a similar number of auxiliary
members. Committee assignments were designed to reflect the pro-
portional weight of each political party's membership in the Con-
gress. Each committee, in turn, was divided into three
10. The history of the ill-fated Cruzado Plan is recounted in Faria,
"Macroeconomic Policymaking in a Crisis Environment: Brazil's Cruzado Plan and
Beyond," in Brazil's Economic and Political Future 42 (Julian Chacel, Pamela Falk
& David Fleischer eds. 1988).
11. In large part because of strategic concealment of the disastrous results of the
Cruzado Plan until after the election, the PMDB managed to elect 298 out of the 559
members of Congress. For a detailed study of the social, economic, educational, and
political background of the members of the Congress, see Fleischer, "Perfil S6cio-
Econ6mico e Politico da Constituinte," in 0 Processo Constituinte 1987-1988, 29
(Milton Guran ed. 1988).
12. The draft constitution prepared by the Commission is published in Constitui-
gio Federal; Anteprojeto da Comissfo Afonso Arinos; Indice Analitico Comparativo
115-272 (Ivan Torres Jfinior ed. 1987). For a critical commentary on the work of the
Arinos Commission, see Ney Prado, Os Notdveis Erros dos Notdveis (1987).
13. Lucas Coelho, "0 Processo Constituinte," in 0 Processo Constituinte 1987-
1988, 41, 43 (Milton Guran ed. 1988).
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subcommittees. The Herculean task of integrating and harmonizing
the oft-times conflicting work product of these 24 drafting groups
was the task of the Committee on Systematization, made up of 93
members of Congress.
This unwieldy drafting process was made even more cumber-
some by an unprecedented amount of popular participation. The As-
sembly's Internal Regulations required each subcommittee to devote
five to eight sessions to hearing from entities representing different
sectors of Brazilian society. Those heard included such diverse
groups as government ministers, unions, landlords, Indians, street
urchins, prostitutes, homosexuals, and maids. The Assembly estab-
lished a computerized data bank containing the thousands of popu-
lar suggestions concerning the contents of the new constitution.
During the seemingly interminable deliberations, virtually all as-
pects of Brazilian society were debated. In principle, nothing was
deemed too trivial for possible inclusion in the new constitutional
text. Some 61,142 amendments were proposed; some 21,000 speeches
were delivered. The annals of the Constituent Assembly filled 100
volumes. 14 Each article of the text of the quasi-final draft had to be
approved twice by a majority of the entire Congress. This proved to
be fortunate, for a number of the more bizarre provisions, such as
the one that protected the right to life, even during cases of fatal ill-
ness, were eliminated in this process.
After an abortive last ditch effort by President Sarney to sabo-
tage the entire process and a final edit for style, the Constitution
was finally promulgated on October 5, 1988, nineteen months after
its gestation period began. No plebiscite or other ratification proce-
dure was held.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION
Brazil's long awaited Constitution is a lengthy, detailed and con-
voluted document, containing 245 articles and 70 transitory provi-
sions.' 5 Together these 315 articles take up 193 pages in the official
publication. The drafters obviously ignored the wisdom in John
Marshall's celebrated dictum in McCulloch v. Maryland:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdi-
visions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would
partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely
14. Lombardo, "A Constituig&o: Resultado de 613 dias de trabalho," Gazeta Mer-
cantil, Oct. 6, 1988 at 1; Jornal do Brasil, Sept. 3, 1988, 1st Caderno at 4.
15. The Constitution went through nine different drafts. Earlier drafts were
even more voluminous and convoluted. The first draft, nicknamed "Frankenstein,"
contained 501 articles.
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be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never
be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires,
that only its great outlines should be marked, its important
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which com-
pose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves.16
Instead, they included in the constitutional text a great many de-
tailed rules normally found in ordinary legislation or regulations.
This confusion of constitutional rules with ordinary legislation
resulted from five factors. One was the role confusion created by
having the Congress double as a Constituent Assembly. The second
was the generalized concern about disrespect for law; many felt en-
shrinement of detailed rules in the Constitution, rather than ordi-
nary legislation, was the only way to insure that they would be
respected. The third was the widespread belief that a constitution
can be a societal panacea and that Brazil's gargantuan economic and
social problems could be miraculously cured by the choice of appro-
priate words in the constitutional text.17 The fourth was Brazil's
prolix constitutional tradition; Brazil has never had a concise consti-
tution.18 Finally, there was the influence of the dirigiste model of
the 1976 Portuguese Constitution, a lengthy, programmatic docu-
ment designed to determine the political course of action of future
governments.
A Constitution only partly in force
Paradoxically, despite the great detail with which many areas
have been regulated, a vast amount of implementing legislation
must be enacted in order to make Brazil's new Constitution fully ef-
fective. According to Saulo Ramos, Minister of Justice in the Sarney
regime, the Constitution requires enactment of some 285 ordinary
statutes and 41 complementary laws in order to effectuate its provi-
sions.19 This is the result of the programmatic and polemical nature
of many of its provisions;20 only by postponing the details to future
legislation was the Constituent Assembly able to complete the Con-
16. 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819).
17. The naive faith that almost any social or economic ill can be cured by legal
prescription is part of the legal legacy that Brazil inherited from Portugal. Rosenn,
"Brazil's Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited," 1 Fla Intl L. J. 1, 19 (1984).
18. Costa & Amaral, "Necessidade de uma Constituifo concisa," 298 Rev. For.
107, 109-110 (1987).
19. Ramos, "A honra substabelecida," Folha de Sdo Paulo, Sept. 16, 1990.
20. The Constitution's programmatic nature is apparent throughout. Thus, Arti-
cle 3 states that country's fundamental objectives are:
I- to construct a free, just and unified society;
II- to guarantee national development;
III- to eradicate poverty and marginal living conditions and to reduce social
and regional inequalities;
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stitution. Thus far, Congress has failed to comply with most of the
directives and deadlines it formulated when wearing its Constituent
Assembly hat. The great bulk of the implementing legislation has
yet to be enacted,21 leaving many provisions inoperative and produc-
ing considerable litigation by persons or groups seeking to imple-
ment constitutional guarantees without having to wait for the
implementing legislation. 22 In addition, thousands of existing laws
have been implicitly revoked or need to be modified to conform with
the new Constitution; failure to adapt existing legislation to new
constitutional requirements has left many areas in a state of juridi-
cal chaos.23
Basic flaws in design and drafting
Like a cathedral originally constructed as a hotel, the new Con-
stitution is structurally flawed. Initially, a majority of the Constitu-
ent Assembly appeared to be committed to choosing a parliamentary
system of government, and many provisions were framed in contem-
plation of a parliamentary form of government. Even though a pres-
idential system was ultimately adopted, a number of parliamentary
provisions have remained in the text. As Ulysses Guimarfes, who
presided over the Constituent Assembly, put it: "The body is parlia-
mentary, with presidential attire.' '24 As will be seen, institutions
like the provisional measure, which were designed for a parliamen-
tary system, have become seriously distorted in a presidential
system.25
The new Constitution lacks organic unity. Because it was
drafted without any master plan by 24 Congressional subcommit-
tees, the Constitution contains no coherent vision as a plan of gov-
ernment. It is a hodgepodge of progressive, conservative, liberal,
IV- to promote the well-being of all, without prejudice as to origin, race, sex,
color, age and any other forms of discrimination.
21. One year after the Constitution's promulgation, only 30 implementing meas-
ures had been enacted. These are set out in Garcez, "Os dispositivos da Constituig~o
ji regulamentados," Gazeta Mercantil, Oct. 6, 1989 at 35. At the end of July 1990,
nearly 300 constitutional provisions were still awaiting implementing legislation.
Sigrist, "A importincia da autoridade do Congresso para a democracia," Gazeta Mer-
cantil, July 21 & 23, 1990 at 5.
22. Examples of constitutional provisions that have generated considerable un-
successful litigation to enforce them in the absence of implementing legislation are
the prohibition against charging more than 12 percent annual interest in real terms,
the guaranty against arbitrary discharge of employees, and the right of civil servants
to strike. See Trevisan, "A Constituigdo que ainda nio estA em vigor," Gazeta Mer-
cantil, Mar. 1, 1990.
23. Ramos, supra n. 19.
24. Guimarfes, "Constituigo--certos erros e principios fundamentais," Folha de
Sdo Paulo, May 6, 1990 at A-3.
25. See nn. 47-54 infra and the accompanying text.
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radical, and moderate provisions, all rather uncomfortably en-
sconced side-by-side in the same document.
Brazil's 1988 Constitution is also poorly drafted. Some articles
are absurdly long, such as Article 5, which contains 77 subdivisions
and 22 subsections. Some provisions are unclear, overlapping, or re-
dundant. Provisions that ought to be grouped together are some-
times scattered throughout disparate parts of the document.
Illustrative of the style of the new Constitution is the way in which
it protects freedom of speech and the press.
Freedom of speech and press
The new Constitution contains several free speech and free
press provisions that commendably broaden prior constitutional
guarantees by eliminating prior restraints.26 Whereas prior free
speech and press guarantees were rather concisely stated in a single
article, 27 they are now widely dispersed in a series of sometimes
overlapping or redundant provisions. The first is Article 5, subpara-
graph IV, which cryptically states:
Manifestation of thought is free, but anonymity is
forbidden.
Article 5, subparagraph IX, then overlaps and somewhat confusingly
expands this guarantee by providing:
Expression and communication of intellectual, artistic, and
scientific activity are free, independent of any censorship or
license.
Just in case one missed the message, more than one hundred articles
later, these guarantees are reiterated in Article 220:
26. The issue of whether the Constitution should ban prior censorship is an old
one in Brazil. The Constitutions of 1824 and 1891 generically prohibited censorship,
but many, including the members of the nation's highest court, did not interpret this
prohibition to prevent prior censorship of public shows and diversions. Since 1934,
all Brazilian Constitutions, except for the present one, have permitted censorship of
public shows and diversions. Gongalves Ferreira Filho, supra n. 7 at 591.
27. Article 153 § 8 of the 1969 Constitution provided:
"Manifestation of thought, political or philosophical conviction, is free, as
well as the rendering of information independent of censorship, except in
public diversions and shows, each one being liable, in the terms of the law,
for the abuses he commits. The right of reply is assured. The publication of
books, newspapers, and magazines does not depend upon the license of an
authority. But propaganda of war, subversion of order or religious, racial or
class bias, and publications and dramatizations contrary to morality and
good customs will not be tolerated."
Despite this seemingly significant guarantee of free speech and press, the military
regimes imposed blatant censorship on the press and the public in the name of na-
tional security. See Dassin, "Press Censorship and the Military State in Brazil," in
Press Control around the World 149-186 (Jane Curry & Joan Dassin eds. 1982). Cf.
Dassin, "The Brazilian Press and Politics of Abertura," 26 J. Inter-Am. Stud. &
World Aff. 385 (Aug. 1984).
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The expression of thoughts, creation, speech and informa-
tion, through whatever form, process or vehicle, shall be
subject to no restrictions, observing the -provisions of this
Constitution.
§ 10. No law shall contain any provision that might con-
stitute an impediment to the full freedom of information by
the press in any medium of social communication, observing
the provisions of art. 5, IV, V, X, XIII, and XIV.
§ 2°. Any and all censorship of a political, ideological
and artistic nature is prohibited.28
The new Constitution creates a vague, undefined constitutional
right to information, as well as a constitutional shield that may en-
able journalists to protect their sources. It assures everyone "access
to information, safeguarding the secrecy of sources whenever neces-
sary for the exercise of one's profession."29 Article 5, subparagraph
XII, safeguards the secrecy of correspondence, data, and telegraphic
and telephonic communications, permitting wiretaps only by judicial
order in connection with criminal investigations or prosecutions.
All of these guarantees are qualified, and to a certain extent un-
dermined, by provisions designed to safeguard actions for libel, slan-
der, and the protection of privacy. Thus, Article 5, subparagraph V,
safeguards "a right of reply, proportional to the injury," as well as a
right to compensation for material and moral damages.30 It also
safeguards a right to indemnification for damages to one's image,
although what that adds to material and moral damages is unclear.
Article 5, subparagraph X, rather redundantly provides that:
Personal intimacy, private life, honor, and reputation are
inviolable, guaranteeing the right to compensation for pecu-
28. The remainder of Article 220 permits the federal government to inform the
public about the nature of shows and exhibitions and to establish measures allowing
the public to defend itself against unwanted radio and TV programs. It also permits
governmental regulation of advertisements for tobacco, alcohol, agro-toxics, and
medicines.
29. Const. of 1988, art. 5, subpara. (XIV). The right of access to certain kinds of
government information is also secured by Article 5, subparagraph LXXII, which
creates a constitutional procedural innovation, habeas data, discussed infra at nn.
107-110 and accompanying text. In 1977, a right of information was added to Article
6 of the Mexican Constitution, but legislation clarifying and implementing this right
has yet to be enacted. A statutory right to freedom of information has been created
in a number of countries, including Sweden, France, Norway, Canada, and the
United States. See Quintanilla-Madero, "Toward a Law of Public Access to Govern-
ment Information in Mexico," 20 U Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 93, 99 (1988).
30. Like other civil law jurisdictions, Brazil distinguishes between material dam-
ages, which result in a diminution of the victim's patrimony through pecuniary loss
and physical injury, and moral damages, such as pain, suffering, or emotional dis-
tress, which do not reduce the victim's patrimony. See generally, Wilson Melo da
Silva, 0 Dano Moral e Sua Reparaqdo (3d ed. 1983); Litvinoff, "Moral Damages," 38
La. L. Rev. 1 (1977); Friedler, "Moral Damages in Mexican Law," 8 Loy. L.A. Int'l &
Comp. L. J. 235 (1986).
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niary and moral damages resulting from the violation
thereof.
The Brazilian Penal and Civil Codes impose potentially serious
liability for calumny, defamation, and injury, which are considered
both torts and crimes.3' Brazil also has a Press Law that imposes
criminal liability upon journalists.32 Given the potential criminal
and civil liabilities that can be imposed under Brazilian law for defa-
mation or calumny, particularly with respect to criticisms of offi-
cials, it is difficult to square the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press with the constitutional
guarantees of damages for injuries to honor and reputation.33
31. Libel, slander, and invasion of privacy are both criminal offenses as well as
torts in Brazil. Article 138 of the Brazilian Penal Code makes calumny (caltinia)-
falsely accusing someone of activity or an omission that constitutes a crime-punish-
able by six months to two years in detention. Article 139 of the Penal Code makes
defamation (difamaqfo)-attributing to someone a fact offensive to his or her repu-
tation-punishable by three months to a year in detention. Article 140 of the Penal
Code makes indignity (injziria)-injuring someone by offending his sense of dignity
or decency-punishable by one to six months in detention.
These offenses are also punishable by fines of up to 1800 times the monthly min-
imum wage, roughly $99,000 to $140,000 in the past year, depending upon the ex-
change rate and changes in the minimum wage rate. Penalties and fines are
increased by one-third if the victim is the President of Brazil, head of any foreign
government, or a public functionary. They also increase by one-third if the offense
is committed in the presence of several people or in a way that the information is
likely to be widely divulged. The penalties double if the offense is committed for
money.
One may also be held civilly liable for committing any of these offenses. Le-
gally, damages may be up to twice the maximum fine. Civil Code, art. 1547.
Truth is an affirmative defense only in a calumny action. It can be used as a
defense in a defamation action only if the aggrieved party is a public employee and
the offense referred to his exercise of official functions. Truth is no defense to an
action for indignity.
32. Article 20 of Law No. 5.250 of Feb. 9, 1967 (the Press Law) makes it a crime
punishable by detention from six months to three years and a fine of up to 20 times
the minimum wage to publish through the media a false accusation of a criminal act
or omission. If the offended victim is the President of the Republic, the President of
the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies, a Minister of the Supreme Federal Tribunal,
the head of a foreign government, or a foreign diplomat, truth cannot be proven as a
defense. Art. 20 § 3. Article 21 makes it a crime, punishable by detention from three
to 18 months and a fine of up to ten times the minimum wage, to defame someone
through the media by attributing a fact offensive to his reputation. Article 22 makes
it a crime, punishable by detention of one month to one year or a fine up to ten
times the minimum wage, to injure someone through the media by offending his
sense of dignity or decency.
33. See Ramos, supra n. 19. In practice, however, these potential liabilities are
not a serious constraint upon freedom of speech and the press, largely because of the
historic tendency of Brazilian courts to award low damages and because proceedings
normally drag on for many years. Vigorous political debate goes on despite threats
of defamation actions, and the Brazilian media continually report on corruption and
scandals in high places and openly criticize government policies and officials. Some
charge that various newspaper and television firms engage in self-censorship for fear
of government retaliation with respect to advertising and credit, but that charge is
difficult to accept in view of what is actually printed and aired in Brazil, and is vigor-
ously denied by many media sources. See U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on
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Planned obsolescence
The new Brazilian Constitution, like so much modem machin-
ery, is an example of planned obsolescence. In sharp contrast with
the U.S. Constitution, which was ". . .intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs," 34 Brazil's new Constitution was intended to endure
for only five years. On September 7, 1993, the Constitution calls for
the holding of a plebiscite to determine whether Brazil should re-
main a republic or become a constitutional monarchy, and whether
it should retain presidentialism or adopt parliamentarianism. 35 The
Constitution calls for revision of its text in October 1993, by a vote of
an absolute majority of the members of the National Congress.36
This is an incredibly unwise and dangerous provision, for it makes
the entire Constitution amendable by a single majority vote of both
houses of Congress. 37 It thus defeats one of the most basic purposes
of a written constitution; namely the preservation of a particular vi-
sion of structuring and limiting power and protecting that vision
from being easily overthrown by future generations.38 Ironically,
the drafters of Brazil's Constitution deliberately designed a charter
that is likely to self-destruct after only five years. Many, including
President Collor, are so disenchanted with the Constitution that
they are urging that the general constitutional revision now set for
1993 be moved up to 1991 or 1992.
BASIC REALLOCATIONS OF POWER
The new Constitution was designed to weaken the Executive
and strengthen the Legislature. The Constitution makes the Presi-
dent accountable to Congress, which can, at least in theory, sanction
him or impeach him.39 The House or the Senate, or one of their
Commissions, can require that any Minister of State appear person-
Human Rights Practices for 1989, Jt. Rep. to House Comm. on For. Affs. & Sen.
Comm. on For. ReL, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 489 (1990) [hereafter cited as Country
Reports].
34. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819).
35. Const. of 1988, Transitory Provisions, art. 2.
36. Id., Transitory Provisions, art. 3.
37. Constitutional amendments may be proposed by the President, one-third of
the House of Representatives or the Senate, or more than one-half the state legisla-
tures. Approval requires two successive votes by at least three-fifths of each house
of Congress. The only provisions that may not be amended are the federal system of
government; direct, secret, universal, and periodic suffrage; separation of powers;
and the individual rights and guaranties. Const. of 1988, art. 60.
38. Levinson, "Law as Literature," 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373, 376 (1982).
39. Impeachment was provided for ministers of state under Brazil's 1824 Consti-
tution. Art. 47 § 2*. Provision for impeachment of the president has been part of
Brazilian constitutions since 1891. E.g, Const. of 1891, arts. 53 and 54. Although
there have been a number of well-qualified candidates, no Brazilian president has
ever faced impeachment charges.
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ally before it and testify or answer written interrogatories. Failure
to comply without good reason constitutes cause for impeachment.40
Congress has exclusive competence to accept or reject any interna-
tional agreement that has serious financial consequences for the na-
tional patrimony,41 a provision that is likely to complicate greatly
Brazil's efforts to renegotiate its foreign debt and to conduct foreign
policy. 42
Potentially, the most important power transference was the at-
tempt to concentrate virtually all law making powers in the Con-
gress. This was a reaction to one of the most abused aspects of the
constitutional system imposed by the military regimes, legislation by
Executive decree. 43 The new Constitution, therefore, deprives the
President of the power to issue decree-laws. 44 In addition, the Con-
stitution seeks to give Congress exclusive power to control rule-
making by administrative agencies. Hence, all acts of the Executive,
including acts of indirect administration, are theoretically made sub-
ject to either direct control of the Congress or through the control of
the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate alone.45 Despite these meas-
ures, the real focus of decision-making power has remained in the
Executive.
The provisional measure
In place of the decree-law, the new constitutional scheme autho-
rizes the Executive to issue delegated laws with prior Congressional
assent. Except for a few reserved subjects, Congress may delegate to
the President the power to enact legislation.4 6 In cases of relevance
and urgency, the President may also issue provisional measures,
which have the force of law, but he must submit these measures im-
mediately to Congress. If not converted by Congress into law within
30 days, provisional measures lose their efficacy ab initio, a feature
40. Const. of 1988, art. 50 & 50 § 2.
41. Id., art. 49, subpara. I.
42. For example, Senate Resol. No. 62 of Dec. 15, 1989, imposes a limit of 10 per-
cent of net real receipts (about U.S. $10 billion) on all foreign and domestic borrow-
ing by the Federal Government and its agencies.
43. Under Article 55 of the 1969 Constitution, in cases of emergency or relevant
public interest, the President had the power to issue decree-laws dealing with na-
tional security, public finance, and public employment. These decree-laws had the
force of law as soon as published. Congress had 60 days to disapprove them, but
could not amend them. Until specifically disapproved, decree-laws remained in
force. Military presidents were not the only ones to resort to decree-laws; President
Sarney issued 209 of these measures between 1985 and 1988.
44. Transitory Article 25 provided for revocation of decree-laws not ratified by
Congress within 180 days after promulgation of the Constitution.
45. Const. of 1988, art. 49, subpara. X.
46. Const. of 1988, art. 68. The form of delegation is a Congressional resolution
setting forth the subject and the terms of the delegation.
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fraught with potential for creation of juridical chaos.47
The delegated law has seen little use, but the provisional mea-
sure, which was designed as an extraordinary device, has become a
celebrated example of the Brazilian jeito, a highly prized paralegal
institution for bending legal norms to expediency. 48 The provisional
.measure has been regularly utilized by both Presidents Sarney and
Collor to enact a wide variety of legislative initiatives. As of Decem-
ber 17, 1990, some 290 provisional measures have been promulgated,
the great bulk of which have been approved by Congress. If not ap-
proved by Congress within thirty days, provisional measures have
often been repromulgated. Indeed, provisional measures specifically
disapproved by Congress have occasionally been repromulgated, gen-
erating serious debate about the constitutionality of the practice.
The Supreme Federal Tribunal appears to have resolved the contro-
versy by holding that it is unconstitutional for the President to re-
publish a provisional measure that has been rejected by Congress. 49
Recently, President Collor voluntarily withdrew three provisional
measures whose constitutionality had been challenged in a direct ac-
tion brought by the Procurator General before the Supreme Federal
Tribunal. Collor accepted the Procurator General's position that a
provisional measure rejected by Congress may not be repromulgated
and that criminal penalties must be imposed by law rather than by
provisional measures.50
The concept of the provisional measure was borrowed from It-
aly, which has a parliamentary form of government. Transplanted
to Brazil, the provisional measure has become the critical device for
retaining legislative initiative with the Executive. Failure to sur-
round the provisional measure with sufficient safeguards to prevent
executive domination of the legislative process has been a widely ac-
knowledged major drafting deficiency of the constitution.51
47. Const. of 1988, arts. 62 and 84, subpara. XXVI. For an excellent analysis of
the provisional measure, see Tficito, "As medidas provis6rias na Constitui&fio de
1988," 305 Rev. For. 13 (1989).
48. See Rosenn, "Brazil's Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited," 1 Fla. Int7 L. J. 1
(1984).
49. "STF mantem liminares suspensas," Gazeta Mercantil, June 23 & 25, 1990 at
6.
50. Castro, "Collor reconhece ilegalidade de tr~s medidas provis6rias," Gazeta
Mercantil, Aug. 24, 1990. President Collor withdrew Provisional Measures 153 and
156 because they imposed criminal penalties; he withdrew Provisional Measure 190
because it was a repromulgation of Provisional Measure 185, which had been specifi-
cally rejected by Congress.
51. For example, Ulysses Guimarfes recently admitted:
"We were also improvident in permitting provisional measures in art.
62 without the indispensable safeguards. We gave the President of the Re-
public irresponsible privileges. First, to legislate by decrees that have in-
stantaneous effect as laws for up to 30 days. Second, we did not limit the
area of this power, which can invade, and indeed is invading, the exclusive
powers of the National Congress, Federal Senate or Chamber of Deputies.
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Thus, in practice the President has dominated the legislative
process through his ability to issue provisional measures with the
force of law.52 Although an occasional measure has been rejected by
Congress, most have been approved or have not been acted upon
within 30 days. Instead of initiating its own legislation, Congress has
spent much of its time debating whether to approve provisional
measures sent to it by the Executive.
Nor has the Judiciary proved to be much of a check upon the
Executive's use and misuse of the provisional measure. The only
constitutional limitation on the President's decision to issue a provi-
sional measure is that the matter be relevant and urgent, but deter-
mination of relevance and urgency has been regarded as an issue
solely for the President's determination, rather than a legal issue for
the courts. When he sought to insulate certain constitutionally dubi-
ous measures from effective judicial review, President Collor simply
issued a provisional measure depriving the courts of the power to is-
sue preliminary injunctions against the economic measures con-
tained in the Collor Plan. When Congress failed to ratify this
provisional measure, Collor simply republished it four more times
until Congress finally enacted it into law.53 Previously, the Supreme
Federal Tribunal, Brazil's highest court, had refused to declare such
a limitation on the remedial powers of the courts unconstitutional,
preferring to let Congress bear responsibility for interfering with
the government's economic recovery program.54
Tax revenues
The new Constitution redistributes a substantial amount of tax
revenue from the federal government to the states and municipali-
ties, but it does nothing to improve basic inequalities in the tax sys-
tem. It has been calculated that the percentage of federal tax
revenues that will be transferred to the states and municipalities
will increase from the present 33 percent to 38.8 percent. Conse-
Third, because the President of the Republic can repeatedly issue provi-
sional measures without limits, even when rejected by passage of time or by
the Congress." Guimardes, supra n. 24.
52. The Constitution also grants the President exclusive powers to initiate cer-
tain kinds of legislation, such as laws affecting the Armed Forces, financial matters,
public employment, or administrative organization. Const. of 1988, art. 61 § 1.
53. The prohibition against preliminary injunctions challenging Collor's eco-
nomic reforms was first issued as Provisional Measure No. 173 on March 18, 1990,
which expired because it was not examined by Congress within thirty days from its
publication. It was republished as Provisional Measure No. 182 on April 23, 1990. It
was then republished as Provisional Measure No. 186 on May 23, 1990, Provisional
Measure No. 192 on June 22, 1990, and Provisional Measure No. 198 on July 26, 1990.
Finally, Congress approved Provisional Measure No. 198, making it Law No. 8,076 of
August 23, 1990.
54. The vote was 7 to 2. Decision of Apr. 5, 1990, reported in Gazeta Mercantil,
Apr. 6, 1990 at 31.
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quently, federal tax receipts will diminish by about 17.6 percent,
gradually becoming a diminution of about 21.6 percent by 1992.55
The immediate response of the Sarney government, however, was to
launch a program called "Operago Desmonte," which more than
nullified the redistributive effect of this reform by transferring to
the state and local governments more of the burdens of funding cer-
tain social programs, such as education and health. The lament of
the state and local governments has been that the burdens trans-
ferred to them more than offset the great share of federally col-
lected revenues they will receive.
The Constitution contains programmatic provisions indicating
how tax revenues are to be spent. For example, Article 212 provides
that the Federal Government will spend at least 18 percent of its tax
revenues, and the States, Federal District, and counties at least 21
percent of their tax revenues, on the maintenance and development
of education. This provision has already resulted in a direct action
of unconstitutionality filed before the Supreme Federal Tribunal by
the Procurator General, challenging the 1990 Budget Law for non-
compliance. This caused the Gazeta Mercantil, Brazil's Wall Street
Journal, to editorialize:
In requesting the Supreme [Tribunal] to consider such a
change in expenditures unconstitutional, the Procurator
General called attention to the failings of a Congress that
voted a constitution and soon thereafter regarded it, in this
specific case, as a dead letter, in which it was accompanied,
with apparent vacillation, by the renewed Executive.M
Strengthening of the judiciary
The powers of the judiciary have been strengthened. Article 99
guarantees the financial and administrative autonomy of the judici-
ary by allowing the courts to elaborate their own budgets. This fi-
nancial autonomy is limited significantly by the requirement the
Judiciary's budget stay within parameters determined by the other
branches of government in the budget laws. This guarantee is also
considerably weaker than the guarantees found in several Latin
American constitutions that the courts be allocated a specific per-
centage of the budget or governmental receipts.57 It has not pre-
vented a series of strikes that have virtually paralyzed state
judiciaries in many parts of Brazil.
55. Friedlander, "Unijio perde 17.6% da receita em um ano," Gazeta Mercantil,
Oct. 6, 1988 at 7. See also "Constituinte e a Reforma Tributfria," 42 Cono. Econ. 7
(No. 8, Aug. 1988).
56. "Constituiqo e Educagdo," Gazeta Mercantil, July 25, 1990 at 4.
57. See Rosenn, "The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America," 19
U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1987).
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Long delays in payment of judgments against governmental en-
tities has been a chronic problem in Brazil. To reduce these delays,
Article 100 requires that all judgments against federal, state, and
municipal governments be paid in chronological order, and that
monetarily corrected budgetary provisions be made each year to pay
all pending judgments. Unfortunately, this fair and sensible mea-
sure has been undercut by Transitory Provision Article 33, which
permits governments to pay off unpaid judgments in annual install-
ments over a period of eight years.
A number of new remedies have been created to insure greater
judicial protection of constitutional rights.58 These new constitu-
tional remedies, particularly the direct action of unconstitutionality,
substantially expand the powers of the courts to control governmen-
tal actions.
Under the new Constitution, the Supreme Federal Tribunal has
become primarily a constitutional court.59 The old intermediate fed-
eral appeals court, the Federal Tribunal of Recourses, has been re-
placed by a Superior Tribunal of Justice, which is now the court of
last resort for a good deal of the appellate caseload formerly decided
by the Supreme Court and the Federal Appellate Tribunal.60 Arti-
cle 98(I) accords constitutional status to small claims courts, a highly
successful experiment proposed by H6lio Beltrdo, then Minister of
Debureaucratization, and authorized by federal statute in 1984.61
The military
The interests of the military, including its right to intervene in
matters of national security, continue to be amply protected.62 A
58. See Section VII infra.
59. In addition to resolving constitutional questions, the Supreme Federal Tribu-
nal has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear: (1) criminal charges against and
habeas corpus requests in favor of the President, Vice-President, members of Con-
gress, its own members, and the Procurator General (Art. 102, subparas. I(b) & (d);
(2) criminal and impeachment charges against and habeas corpus in favor of Minis-
ters of State, members of appellate tribunals and the Tribunal of Accounts, and
heads of diplomatic missions (Art. 102, subparas. I(c) & (d); (3) litigation between
foreign countries or international organs and the Brazilian government (Art. 102,
subpara. I(c); (4) interstate conflicts and conflicts between the federal government
and the states (Art. 102, subpara. I(f); (5) international extradition requests (Art.
102, subpara. I(g); and (6) requests for recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments and concessions of letters rogatory (Art. 102, subpara. I(h). The wisdom of
conferring original jurisdiction in the last two categories of cases on the highest
court, particularly one with an incredibly congested docket, is highly questionable,
but this merely continues previous constitutional allocations of jurisdiction. The
Supreme Federal Tribunal also has appellate jurisdiction in a small number of cases
that may not involve any constitutional issues.
60. The jurisdiction of the Superior Tribunal of Justice is set out in Article 105.
61. See Rosenn, "Civil Procedure in Brazil," 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 487, 521-22
(1986).
62. The Army, Navy, and Air Force are declared to be permanent national insti-
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broad amnesty is conceded for all acts motivated solely by political
reasons between 1946 and 1988.63 Habeas corpus will not lie for in-
fractions of military discipline,64 nor does the constitutional guar-
anty against being arrested without a warrant apply to military
offenses.65 Sensibly, members of the military have neither the right
to strike nor to join unions.66
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Many of the new Constitution's provisions represent significant
liberal or progressive advancements, particularly with regard to pro-
tection of individual rights and expansion of the rights of the work-
ing class. Article 5 protects a large number of individual and
collective rights. This enormous article appears to protect virtually
every form of known human right. Torture, racism, and others
forms of inhuman or degrading treatment are not only prohibited,6 7
but are declared to be nonbailable offenses.6 8 Paradoxically, this
provision invites human rights abuses by mandating pretrial deten-
tion for persons only accused of such offenses. 69 Men and women
are declared to have equal rights and obligations.70 The rights to in-
timacy and privacy are unqualifiedly guaranteed,7 1 but the signifi-
cance of such guarantees will have to await judicial interpretation.
Since Brazil is the world's largest Catholic country, they are un-
likely to be interpreted to support a right to abortion. No one may
be arrested without a warrant except in cases of apprehension in
flagrante delicto or military transgressions. 72 No one can enter an-
tutions and military intervention is permitted to protect law and order at the request
of any of the constitutional powers. Const. of 1988, art. 142. Military service is obli-
gatory in terms of the law. Id., art. 143. The rights and prerogatives of members of
the military are amply protected. Id., art. 42.
63. Id., Transitory Provisions, art. 8.
64. Id., art. 142 § 2.
65. Id., art. 5, subpara. LXI.
66. Id., art. 42 § 5.
67. Id., art. 5, subpara. III.
68. Id., art. 5, subparas. XLII & XLIII.
69. The enormous potential for abuse is readily apparent upon reading Law No.
7.716 of January 5, 1989, which makes racism a criminal offense. The statute simply
says in its first article: "Crimes resulting from racial or color bias shall be punished
in the form of this law." The remainder of the articles set out punishments ranging
from one to five years for denying or impeding access to public or private employ-
ment; refusing or impeding access to or refusing service on public transportation or
at any commercial establishment, bar, restaurant, hotel, or club open to the public;
refusing to allow a student to enroll in a public or private school; and impeding or
obstructing, by any means or form, a marriage or family or social living together.
Nowhere does the statute define the mental element necessary for commission
of the offense. Presumably, a parent who objected to the color or race of a prospec-
tive son or daughter-in-law might be charged with the offense.
70. Const. of 1988, art. 5, subpara. I.
71. Id., art. 5, subpara. X.
72. Id., art. 5, subpara. LXI.
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other's home without consent, except for cases of flagrante delicto,
disaster, or rendering aid; otherwise, the police may enter only with
a judicial order, and even then only during the day.73 Illegally ob-
tained evidence is inadmissible at trial.74 Prisoners have a right to
be informed of their rights, including their right to remain silent
and to have the assistance of family and counsel.75 The State must
render full legal assistance without charge to those unable to afford
it. 7 6
In many Latin American constitutions, individual liberties are
sharply reduced whenever a state of siege or other form of emer-
gency is declared. Although following this pattern, the new Brazil-
ian Constitution commendably places important constraints upon
executive power during times of emergency. The President can de-
clare a state of defense for up to 60 days whenever public order or
social peace is threatened and may decree restrictions upon the
rights of assembly and the secrecy of the mails, telephones, and tele-
graphs. 77 During this period, the executive may imprison persons
for up to ten days for crimes against the State, provided the impris-
onment is communicated to a competent judge and the prisoner is
not maintained incommunicado. The declaration of the state of de-
fense must be submitted to Congress for ratification within 24
hours.78 A state of siege may be declared by the President, only if
authorized to do so by Congress, and then only in cases of grave
commotion or a state of war or its equivalent. 79 During a state of
siege, the executive can require persons to remain in a determined
place, detain persons in a building that is not used to house ordinary
prisoners, restrict liberty of the press and other communication me-
dia, violate the secrecy of correspondence and other forms of com-
munication, suspend freedom of assembly, commit searches and
seizures in homes, intervene in public services, and requisition prop-
73. Id., art. 5, subpara. XI.
74. Id., art. 5, subpara. LVI.
75. Id., art. 5, subpara. LXIII. Whether this constitutional right to remain silent
will change existing Brazilian law is unclear. Under Article 186 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, Decree Law No. 3.931 of Dec. 11, 1941, the judge has the duty to
notify the accused that although he may remain silent, "his silence may be inter-
preted to prejudice his defense." In addition, Article 198 provides: "Silence of the
accused does not imply his confession, but it may constitute an element in convinc-
ing the judge."
76. Id., art. 5, subpara. LXXIV. The Constitution also provides for creation of a
Public Defender to defend the indigent at all stages of judicial proceedings. Id., Art.
134. See generally, Rog6rio Tucci & Jos6 Cruz e Tucci, Constituiqdo de 1988 e
Processo 19-27 (1989).
77. Const. of 1988, art. 136 § 1.
78. Id., art. 136 § 4. Within ten days, Congress, by an absolute majority, must de-
cide whether to ratify the state of defense.
79. Id., art. 137.
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erty.s° A state of siege for reasons of grave commotion may not be
decreed for more than 30 days, and cannot be extended for longer
than 30 days at a time. Unfortunately, protection of certain aspects
of individual rights is an area in which the gap between the Consti-
tution on paper and the Constitution in practice looms largest.
When, on February 5, 1989, police in S~o Paulo deliberately pun-
ished 51 prisoners by cramming them into a tiny unventilated cell,
killing 18 prisoners, an editorial in Veja, the Brazilian Newsweek,
made the point forcefully:
Today Brazil has one of the most beautiful Constitutions in
its history in all that it says with respect to fundamental
human rights.... Moreover, there is nothing to complain
about in relation to our laws in this area. The problem is in
the disturbing distance that separates the rights inscribed
on paper from their effective exercise, and above all in the
guaranty of their exercise in practical life. Such distance
has been once again dramatized last week in the massacre
of detainees who mutinied in the cells of a Sfo Paulo police
station-locked into an unventilated cell as punishment,
fortuitously killed by asphyxiation.81
Even though Article 5 (XLIX) guarantees "all prisoners respect for
physical and moral integrity," torture and maltreatment of common
criminals is a fact of life in many Brazilian police stations and jails.82
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Article 6 declares that education, health, labor, leisure, security,
social security, protection of maternity and infancy, and assistance of
the unprotected are social rights. Article 7 contains 34 subsections
that read like a miniature, progressive labor code.83 These provi-
sions protect workers from being fired arbitrarily, create unemploy-
ment insurance, and continue a successful retirement/severance pay
fund for employees called the Fund for Guaranty of Time of Service
(FGTS). The minimum wage, which historically has varied from re-
gion to region, is unified throughout Brazil and is theoretically fixed
at a level sufficient to satisfy the basic necessities of life for each
family, with periodic readjustments to preserve its purchasing
power.8 4 Salaries cannot be reduced unless permitted by a collective
80. Id., art. 139.
81. Feb. 15, 1989 at 23.
82. Amnesty International, Beyond The Law: Torture and Execution in Urban
Brazil (June 1990); Country Reports, supra n. 33 at 487.
83. For more comprehensive treatment of these provisions, see Eduardo Saad,
Constituiqdo e Direito do Trabalho 83-214 (1989); Buchanan, "The Future of Brazil-
ian Labor Law under the Federal Constitution of 1988," 10 Comp. Labor L. J. 214
(1989).
84. Const. of 1988, art. 7, subpara. IV.
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bargaining provision. Employees are given a constitutional right to
share in the profits as defined by law,35 a right which has been theo-
retically granted but never enforced under Brazilian constitutions
since 1946.86 The normal work day is set at eight hours, and the nor-
mal work week is set at 44 hours.5 7 Workers are entitled to annual
paid vacations with at least a 1/3 bonus over their normal pay.88
Women are entitled to at least 120 days of paid maternity leave,
while fathers are entitled to a paid paternity leave whose term is to
be fixed by law.89 Regrettably, little consideration appears to have
been given to the question of whether Brazilian firms can afford to
pay this increased labor bill, or whether the country is willing and
able to shoulder the costs of enforcing these constitutional rights.
Two of the basic principles upon which the economic order is
based are declared to be private property and free competition.90 All
are assured the free exercise of any economic activity, independent
of public authorization, except for cases provided for by law.91 Un-
fortunately, the insertion of the exceptions clause practically nulli-
fies the general rule, for there is very little economic activity in
which one can engage in Brazil without public authorization. Had
they a serious commitment to the principle of free competition, the
drafters should have guaranteed free exercise of economic activity
except for conduct prohibited by the penal law.
The rights of private property appear to be amply protected.
Article 5 (XXII) provides in unqualified terms: "The right of prop-
erty is guaranteed." This guarantee, however, proved of little avail
in March 1990, when the Collor Plan froze all bank and savings ac-
counts in excess of $1200 for 18 months.92 Three days after the Col-
lor Plan was promulgated, the President issued Provisional Measure
No. 173, prohibiting the courts from issuing preliminary injunctions
or provisional proceedings (ancillary or incidental measures to safe-
guard the outcome of judicial proceedings) challenging the validity
of the Collor Plan. Without reaching the merits, the Supreme Fed-
eral Tribunal refused to suspend Provisional Measure No. 173.93
85. Id., art. 7, subpara. XI.
86. See Saad, supra n. 83 at 111-117.
87. Const. of 1988, art. 7, subpara. XIII.
88. Id., art. 7, subpara. XVII.
89. Id., art. 7, subparas. XVIII & XIX.
90. Id., art. 170, subparas. II & IV.
91. Id., art. 170, sole para.
92. Provisional Measure No. 168 of Mar. 15, 1990, confirmed as Law No. 8.024 of
Apr. 12, 1990.
93. The 7-2 decision of the Supreme Federal Tribunal is reported in the Gazeta
Mercantil, Apr. 6, 1990 at 31. In a declaratory judgment action brought by the Fed-
eral Council of the Brazilian Bar Association and the Democratic Labor Party
(PDT), the Supreme Federal Tribunal held that a provisional measure restraining
issuance of preliminary injunctions does not contravene the constitutional guarantee
of access to the judiciary. Official Gazette (DOU), June 25, 1990. These decisions are
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Since an ordinary action almost always requires longer than 18
months to be resolved, the decision refusing to invalidate the prohi-
bition on issuing preliminary protective measures effectively moots
the merits and seriously undercuts the constitutional guarantee of
Article V(XXXV), which states "The law shall not exclude from ju-
dicial review an injury or threat to a right."
Real property is protected, provided it is performing its social
function. 94 Except for agrarian reform, private property can be ex-
propriated only for necessity, public utility, or social interest, upon
payment of just and prior compensation in cash.95 , Productive rural
land can be expropriated for agrarian reform purposes only if it is
being used to cultivate narcotics.96 Small and medium-sized rural
property may not be expropriated unless the owner has other land.97
If nonproductive rural property is expropriated, compensation for
all useful and necessary improvements must be paidin cash, but the
land value may be compensated by bonds, redeemable in up to 20
years, with a maintenance of value clause.98 The likely result of
these provisions is to hinder any serious efforts at agrarian reform,
creating yet another example of the lack of wisdom in attempting to
resolve highly controversial social conflicts by constitutional meas-
ures, rather than ordinary legislation."
Potentially, the most interesting innovation is the Anglo-Ameri-
can transplant: "No one may be deprived of liberty or property
without due process of law."'10 It is difficult to predict what mean-
ing will ultimately be placed upon this due process clause by Brazil-
ian courts and jurists. It might well be construed to have a
substantive component in light of the gloss placed upon it by U.S.
Supreme Court precedents, which are frequently cited by the Brazil-
ian courts when interpreting constitutional provisions transplanted
from the United States.' 0 '
not regarded as binding precedents, however, and lower courts have occasionally
been granting preliminary injunctions or relief on the merits against the freeze on
bank deposits contained in the Collor Plan.
94. Const. of 1988, arts. 5, subpara. XXIII and 170, subparas. II & III. Urban
property fulfills its social function when it meets the fundamental exigencies for or-
dering the city as expressed in its master plan. Id., art. 182 § 2.
Rural property fulfills its social function whenever, in accordance with criteria
established by statute, it is being rationally and adequately utilized, it is making ade-
quate use of its available natural resources and preserving the environment, its own-
ers are complying with labor laws, and its exploitation favors the well-being of its
owners and employees. Id., art. 186.
95. Id., art. 5, subpara. XXIV.
96. Id., arts. 185, 186 & 243.
97. Id., art. 185, subpara. I.
98. Id., art. 184.
.99. Driesen, "Brazil's Transition to Democracy: Agrarian Reform and the New
Constitution," 8 Wis. Int7 L. J. 51 (1989).
100. Const. of 1988, art. 5, subpara. LIV.
101. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, urging that due process ought
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INNOVATIONS IN THE PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The most impressive achievements of the new Constitution are
its procedural innovations in the protection of constitutional and
legal rights. The framers of the new Congtitution determined that
existing Brazilian procedural law has been inadequate to protect
constitutional rights. The problem is an old one in Brazil. In 1832,
the country adopted the Anglo-American writ of habeas corpus,
which gradually was pressed into service to protect every certain
and incontestable constitutional right.10 2 After habeas corpus was
cut back closer to its Anglo-American origins, the Brazilians created
a new institution called the writ of security (mandado de seguranqa)
in the 1934 Constitution to protect any liquid and certain right un-
protected by habeas corpus. The writ of security combines into a
single remedy most of the effective characteristics of the injunction,
writ of prohibition, quo warranto, and mandamus. It has been a
highly effective, summary remedy for protecting certain kinds of
constitutional rights.'0 3
The collective writ of security
The absence of a doctrine of a stare decisis has meant that eve-
ryone aggrieved by a particular statute or regulation must bring his
or her own writ of security in order to secure relief. 0 4 This is ex-
pensive and clogs the courts. The Constituent Assembly, therefore,
created a collective writ of security that can be brought by any polit-
ical party represented in Congress, or by any union, business syndi-
cate, or association, legally constituted for more than one year, to
defend the rights of its members or associates.'05 This procedural
innovation is another sensible step in the creation of the class action,
which began in 1985 as a device to protect the interests of environ-
to have a substantive component, see Carlos Roberto de Siqueira Castro, 0 Devido
Processo Legal e a Razoabilidade das Leis na Nova Constituigdo do Brasil (1989).
See also, Tucci & Cruz e Tucci, supra n. 76 at 15-18.
102. Eder, "Habeas Corpus Disembodied: The Latin American Experience," in
XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law 463, 465-69 (Kurt Nadelmann, Arthur
von Mehren & John Hazard eds. 1961).
103. See Karst & Rosenn, supra n. 4 at 102-24.
104. Brazil does have an analogue to stare decisis called the Stimula, which con-
sists of capsulized authoritative interpretations of legal rules, usually one sentence in
length, drawn from the headnotes to decisions of the Supreme Federal Tribunal and
several other courts. Judicially created rules are enshrined in the Sumula only after
the case law has firmed up, either through en banc uniformity or through several
cases taking the same position. Once a rule has become part of the Stimula, further
attempts to argue the contrary will be summarily rejected by the tribunal, unless it
is prepared to change the Stimula. See Rosenn, supra n. 61 at 513-14 (1986).
105. Const. of 1988, art. 5, subpara. (LXX). For discussions of the procedural im-
plications of the collective writ of security, see Barbi, "Mandado de seguranga na
Constituig~o de 1988," 635 Rev. Trib. 19 (1988); Figueiredo, "Breves reflex~es sobre o
mandado de seguranga no novo texto constitucional," 635 Rev. Trib. 24. (1988).
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mental, cultural, and consumer groups. 1°6
Habeas data
The Constituent Assembly also imported from Portugal a new
action called habeas data.10 7 This procedure allows anyone to dis-
cover all information the government has about him in its data
banks and rectify that data if it is incorrect. 0 8 Unlike most actions,
which require payment of significant amounts as costs, habeas data
(as well as habeas corpus) actions are exempted from payment of
costs.10 9 A number of habeas data actions have already been insti-
tuted in the Brazilian courts.110 In the interest of protecting privacy,
however, the drafters of the Constitution appear to have limited
standing to bring a habeas data action to a person seeking access to
his or her own records and to have excluded heirs or personal repre-
sentatives. The unfortunate consequence of this omission may be to
make habeas data unavailable as a means of finding out the wherea-
bouts of persons who have disappeared.
The direct action of unconstitutionality
Under the 1969 Constitution, the Supreme Court had the power
to determine the unconstitutionality of any law or normative act on
its face in a proceeding called a representation."' The Tribunal's
decisions in representation actions had erga omnes effects, but only
the Procurator General of the Republic had standing to bring such
an action.112 In the new Constitution, the representation has been
renamed the direct action of unconstitutionality, and standing to
bring the action has been expanded to include the President of the
Republic; the Executive Committees of the Senate, House of Repre-
sentatives, or state legislatures; a state governor; the Federal Coun-
cil of the Brazilian Bar Association; any political party represented
in Congress; and any syndical confederation or national class en-
106. Law No. 7.347 of July 24, 1985.
107. Const. of 1988, art. 5, subpara. LXXII.
108. It has been argued that habeas data is superfluous because any relief avail-
able under habeas data was already available under the writ of security. Cretella
Jinior, "0 novo e in6cuo 'writ' constitucional: o 'habeas data'," 304 Rev. For. 99
(1988).
109. Const. of 1988, art. 5, subpara. LXXVII.
110. On the day after promulgation of the Constitution, the Brazilian Supreme
Federal Tribunal received eight suits requesting habeas data. "No primeiro dia,
Supremo recebe oito pedidos de 'habeas-data' contra SNI," Gazeta Mercantil, Oct. 7,
1988 at 5.
111. Const. of 1969, art. 119, subpara. I(1).
112. M.D.B. v. Procurador-Geral da Repdblica, 59 R.T.J. 333 (STF en banc 1971).
For the historical development of representation, see Karst & Rosenn, supra n. 4 at
112-118, 218.
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tity.n 3 This represents a very substantial increase in the ability of
the Supreme Federal Tribunal to declare laws and statutes unconsti-
tutional, but it has the unfortunate effect of depriving the Tribunal
of the benefit of the opinions of the lower courts, of seeing the ac-
tual effect of the statute on litigants, and of being able to duck un-
timely or too sensitive matters by imposing some barrier to
justiciability. Indeed, this power to declare laws unconstitutional in
the abstract may prove too broad and eventually embroil the
Supreme Federal Tribunal in an undue amount of conflict with the
other branches of government.
Unconstitutionality for omission and the mandate of injunction
Well aware of Brazil's long history of underenforcement of con-
stitutional rights and the non-self-executing nature of the many
programmatic provisions, the drafters of Brazil's new Constitution
created two new remedies to deal with the problem: (1) an action of
unconstitutionality for omission and (2) the mandate of injunction
(mandado de injunqdo). Pursuant to Article 103, the Supreme Fed-
eral Tribunal has the power to hear direct actions of unconstitution-
ality dealing with both governmental commissions and omissions.
The declaration of unconstitutionality for omission was designed to
cajole or force the other branches to enact regulatory norms needed
to effectuate certain constitutional provisions. Whenever it issues a
declaration of unconstitutionality "because of lack of measures to
make a constitutional rule effective," the Supreme Federal Tribunal
is charged with notifying the appropriate Branch to adopt the neces-
sary measures. If the omission is caused by an administrative
agency, the Tribunal is to direct that the necessary measures be
adopted within thirty days.114
The mandate of injunction is a new procedural institution to be
granted by the courts whenever lack of a regulatory or implement-
ing rule makes impracticable the exercise of constitutional rights
and liberties and the prerogatives inherent in nationality, sover-
eignty and citizenship." 5 This intriguing innovation, which bears lit-
tle resemblance to the Anglo-American injunction, has generated
considerable legal confusion,"16 for it is unclear for which constitu-
tional rights it will lie. There is an inherent contradiction in giving
the courts the responsibility for enforcing rights that need regula-
113. Const. of 1988, arts. 102(a) & 103. Brazil's action of unconstitutionality is still
narrower than Colombia's popular action, which permits any citizen (defined
broadly to include corporations) to challenge the constitutionality of any statute di-
rectly before the Supreme Court. Colombia Const. of 1886, art. 214(2), as amended.
114. Const. of 1988, art. 103 § 2.
115. Id., art. 5, subpara. LXXI.
116. See generally, Ulderico Pires dos Santos, Mandado de Injunqao-Estudos e
Consideraqges (1988); Irineu Strenger, Mandado de Injungdo (1988).
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tory norms from one of the other branches. Congress has not yet
regulated this new remedy, but a recent decision of the Supreme
Federal Tribunal has held that the mandate of injunction is self-exe-
cuting.117 In the absence of regulatory legislation, the courts have
been utilizing the procedure for the writ of security (mandado de
seguranqa)"s. This means that a summary procedure with a docket
preference, and a decision that has only inter partes effects." 9 Nev-
ertheless, the conceptual and practical difficulties for courts in im-
plementing constitutional rights that require regulatory legislation
in the absence of such legislation has resulted in great judicial reluc-
tance to grant mandates of injunction. 120 Thus far, the mandate of
injunction has not worked. Any successful petitions involve viola-
tions of individual rights, which, by the terms of the Constitution,
have immediate application. 121
The popular action
Brazil's 1934 Constitution established a "popular action" confer-
ring standing upon any citizen to bring an action to nullify or annul
any act that injured the public patrimony. 2 2 Ultimately, this consti-
tutional action was regulated by a special statute, which defined the
kind of injuries that could be redressed by the popular action fairly
narrowly and tended to discourage such actions by requiring the
plaintiff to bear the costs, at least initially; to have to pay the de-
fendant's attorney's fees if plaintiff failed to prevail; and, if the ac-
tion were deemed rashly brought, to pay ten times the normal
costs. 123 The new Constitution has expanded the popular action not
117. Decision of Nov. 23, 1989, in Process No. 103-3/DF, reported in Gazeta Mer-
cantil, Nov. 24, 1989 at 29. See also Costa, "Supremo esclarece o mandado de injun-
9&o," 0 Estado de Sdo Paulo, Mar. 11, 1990 at 34.
118. The 1934 Brazilian Constitution created a new procedural institution called
the writ of security to protect any liquid and certain right unprotected by habeas
corpus. The writ of security combines into a single remedy most of the effective
characteristics of the common law injunction, writ of prohibition, quo warranto, and
mandamus. It has been a highly effective, summary remedy for protecting certain
kinds of constitutional rights. See Karst & Rosenn, supra n. 4 at 102-124.
119. Many mandate of injunctions cases are decided exclusively by the Supreme
Federal Tribunal, which has original jurisdiction in all requests for issuance of a
mandate of injunction involving claims that the legislation or rule necessary to im-
plement a constitutional right should have been issued by some agency of the Fed-
eral Government. Const. of 1988, art. 105, subpara. I(h).
120. The reluctance of Brazilian courts to grant the mandate of injunction is
shown in cases like Costa Filho v. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Mandado de InjunqAo
No. 16, 127 R.T.J. 1 (STF en banc 1988); Capanga v. Juiz Eleitoral, Mandado de In-jungio No. 5, 128 R.T.J. 1 (STF en banc 1988); Silva Sobrinho v. General Comandate,
Mandado de Injungho No. 12, 4 Rev. Sup. Trib. Just. 1393 (Superior Trib. Just. 1989).
121. Id., art. 5, subpara. LXXVII § 1.
122. Const. of 1934, art. 113 (38). See generally, Jos6 Afonso da Silva, Agdo Popu-
lar Constitucional: DoufrMna e Processo (1968).
123. Law No. 4.717 of June 29, 1965, arts. 10 & 13.
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only to include acts that tend to injure the public patrimony, but
also to include acts that injure administrative morality, the environ-
ment, and historic and cultural patrimony.124 Moreover, the plain-
tiff, unless he sues in bad faith, is exempted from costs and from
having to pay the other side's attorney's fees in the event he loses
the case.125
MEASURES OF DUBIOUS AND VERY DUBIOUS WISDOM
A substantial number of provisions make little or no economic
sense and, if enforced, are likely to handicap the development and
modernization of Brazil. These measures include certain provisions
that hardly belong in a constitution, such as a usury limit or specific
regulations of labor and foreign investment.
The crime of usury
The Brazilian Constitution defines the crime of usury as charg-
ing a real rate of interest in excess of 12 percent a year. 2 6 Since
1933, Brazil has had a usury law prohibiting the charging of a nomi-
nal rate of interest in excess of 12 percent a year.127 As one would
expect in a country with chronic severe inflation, 28 Brazil's usury
statute has been turned into a dead letter by the courts.129 Placing a
usury provision in the Brazilian Constitution is not only quixotic,
but it also threatens the entire Brazilian financial system with immi-
nent collapse. 130 Just after the Constitution was promulgated, the
Central Bank issued a circular formally adopting the position that
the constitutional usury provision was not self-executing and re-
quired a complementary law to be implemented. The circular was
124. Const. of 1988, art. 5, subpara. LXXIII.
125. Id.
126. Id., art. 192, subpara. VIII § 3.
127. Decree N ° 22.626 of Apr. 7, 1933. Law N ° 1.521 of Dec. 26, 1951, art. 4, pro-
vides criminal penalties for usury.
128. The official inflation rate for 1988 was 933 percent and 1759 percent for 1989.
Using 1985 as a base year and setting it equal to 100, the consumer price index for
Brazil was up to 304,668 by the end of 1989. International Monetary Fund, 43 Inter-
national Financial Statistics 136-137 (Sept. 1990). This means that in 1989, it cost
more than three thousand times as much to purchase the same market basket of
goods as in 1985.
129. Julian Chacel, Mario Henrique Simonsen & Arnold Wald, Correqdo
Monetdria 19 (1970).
130. In most countries, a usury ceiling of 12 percent in real terms would pose no
serious threat to legitimate lenders. Brazil is different. The same week that the
usury limitation was approved by Congress, the federal government had to pay 13
per cent annual interest in "real" terms on Readjustable Treasury Bonds. Bit-
tencourt, "Coin incredulidade, as instituig6es lamentam a decisio da Assembl6ia,"
Gazeta Mercantil, May 12, 1988 at 6; "Juros tabelados: uma decisio ins6lita da Con-
stituinte," Gazeta Mercantil, May 13, 14, & 16, 1988 at 4. A basic problem is that the
"real" rate of interest is exceedingly difficult to ascertain in Brazil, in part because
of index manipulation and in part because of wide number of indexes in use.
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based upon Opinion No. SR-70 of October 6, 1988, which was issued
by then Consultor General of the Republic, Saulo Ramos. i3 1 This
provision may still create serious problems for the financial sector if
and when Congress enacts implementing legislation.
Labor provisions
Article 8, subparagraph II, prohibits creation of more than a sin-
gle union representing any professional or economic category,
thereby preventing competition and helping to insure the continued
weakness of the Brazilian labor movement. Article 9 contains a
broad and apparently unrestricted right of all workers to strike, a
measure that Brazil is already ruing and which is likely to be re-
stricted by creative interpretation. 132
Transitory Article 19 is a particularly pernicious and short-
sighted provision, granting tenure to all civil servants with at least
five years of public service, regardless of whether they have been
validly admitted to public service. One of Brazil's most serious eco-
nomic and administrative problems is how to reduce the bloated bu-
reaucracies of the federal, state and municipal governments. This
constitutional provision is a major obstacle to badly needed adminis-
trative and economic reform.
Foreign investment
The Constitution's treatment of foreign investment has been
highly controversial and may ultimately retard economic growth.
The wisdom of regulating foreign investment in a constitution is ex-
ceedingly dubious. Nevertheless, foreign investment was a major
subject of debate at the Constituent Assembly, which in this area
displayed virtuosity in confusing ordinary legislation with constitu-
tional principle. The first draft included measures to nationalize
foreign-owned firms; to limit and to require public disclosure of all
sums transferred abroad as royalties, profits, interest, and payments
for technology; and to prohibit transfer to foreigners of all lands
containing mineral deposits. Although the strident nationalism of
131. Circular No. 1.365 of Oct. 6, 1988. A direct action of unconstitutionality
brought by the P.D.T. against the President's Normative Act confirming Ramos'
opinion was rejected preliminarily by the Supreme Federal Tribunal-P.D.T. vs. Pre-
sidente da Rep~iblica, No. 4-7, Oct. 19, 1988, D.J. Feb. 17, 1989.
132. Const. of 1988, art. 9 § 1. This provision enigmatically states that the law
shall define essential services and activities and shall provide about attending to the
non-postponable needs of the community. Art. 9 § 2 states that abuses are subject to
liability under law. In addition, art. 37, subpara. VII states that the right to strike
for public employees shall be exercised in the terms and limits defined by law. Such
provisions may permit the Congress to restrict the right to strike by enactment of
complementary legislation, but Congress has failed to enact legislation restricting
strikes in essential services.
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early drafts has been somewhat softened, the Constitution as en-
acted contains several measures that have generated considerable
consternation within the foreign investment community. The most
important is the banning of foreign-owned companies from explor-
ing for or extracting minerals. All mineral deposits and hydroelec-
tric sites are declared to be the property of the federal government;
mineral exploration and mining is restricted to Brazilian individuals
or Brazilians firms with national capital who obtain authorization or
* a concession from the Federal Government.133 The "Brazilian firm
with national capital," a juridical concept that has emerged since
1969 in a controversial series of laws and decrees,134 is defined con-
stitutionally as "a company whose effective control is permanently
under the title, either directly or indirectly, of individuals resident
and domiciled in Brazil or entities of domestic public law."'1 35 The
Constitution requires the government to give preferential treatment
to firms of national capital in the acquisition of goods and serv-
ices,136 a preference that will only make government purchasing
more expensive. Moreover, given the huge role the Brazilian public
sector plays in many markets, such a preference may well put a
number of foreign investors out of business. Foreign-controlled
companies presently engaged in mining, mineral exploration, or pro-
duction of hydroelectric power in Brazil have four years either to
give up effective control, or to use the power generated in their in-
dustrial processes and to industrialize their mineral output in Bra-
zil. 1 37 At a time when the other countries of Latin America, not to
mention Asia, Europe and North America, are seeking to attract
more foreign investment by liberalizing the legal restrictions on for-
eign capital, and at a time when the Brazilian economy desperately
needs new investment and technology, insertion of these nationalis-
tic provisions in the new Constitution is the equivalent of using
one's foot for target practice.
Another provision that also takes careful aim at Brazil's own
foot is the prohibition on foreign oil companies engaging in oil ex-
ploration through future risk contracts with Petrobrs.l38 These
contracts in the past have been quite unprofitable for the foreign oil
companies, who have invested some $1.6 billion since the program
133. Const. of 1988, art. 176 & art. 176 § 1° .
134. The most controversial has been the Informatics Law, Law N. 7.232 of Oct.
29, 1984, reserving large parts of the computer market to firms of Brazilian national
capital, defined even more narrowly than in the Constitution. For review of the con-
stitutional issues raised by the concept of Brazilian firm of national capital prior to
its validation in the new Constitution, see Gandra da Silva Martins, "Os aspectos
legais do investimento estrangeiro na area da informitica," 301 Rev. For. 3 (1988).
135. Const. of 1988, art. 171,.subpara. II.
136. Id., art. 171 § 2.
137. Id., Transitory Provisions, art. 44.
138. Id., art. 177 § 1.
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began in 1976. Of the 72 risk contracts in force when this provision
was enacted, only 1 had resulted in a viable oil discovery. Given
Brazilian dependence on foreign oil, depriving Petrobrfs of the ac-
cess to foreign risk capital and expertise can only be attributed to
substitution of nationalistic fervor. Another provision specifically
authorizes enactment of legislation temporarily conceding fiscal in-
centives and market reserves to firms of Brazilian national capi-
tal139 This is an open invitation to Congress to extend the market
reserve principle of Brazil's highly controversial Informatics Law to
other markets.
Rounding out these nationalist provisions is one that quixoti-
cally bans all firms and foreign capital from direct or indirect partic-
ipation in health assistance unless specifically excepted by law.140
This is simply a protectionist measure likely to hurt health care
delivery.
The combined effect of these nationalistic provisions is difficult
to calculate, but it seems fair to state that they at least have contrib-
uted to a striking amount of disinvestment. Statistics indicate that
in 1986, when many nationalistic proposals were being debated,
levels of foreign investment dropped sharply, and capital repatria-
tion and dividend remittance levels increased sharply. Foreign in-
vestment levels recovered slightly in 1987, but 1988 and 1989 have




The new Brazilian Constitution is very much a mixed bag. It
has serious problems of both form and substance that make it diffi-
cult to live with. Some of these problems are likely to be worked
out by judicial interpretation and constitutional amendment or revi-
sion, but the Constitution, in its present form, appears destined for a
short duration. Indeed, the Constituent Assembly's open invitation
to the next Congress to revise it totally in five years is foolhardy and
dangerous to the institutional stability of the country.
Brazil's new Constitution is also not likely to endure because it
does too little to come to grips with the major economic and social
139. Id., art. 171 § 1.
140. Id., art. 199 § 3.
141. New direct foreign investment in Brazil fell from a high of U.S. $1.9 billion
in 1981 to only $432.9 million in 1986. Capital repatriation, which had averaged only
$176.4 million a year in the 1978-85 period, soared to $636.7 million in 1986. Profit
remittances, which had averaged only $573.5 million annually between 1979 and
1984, climbed to a record $1.278 billion in 1986. The rate of outflow appears to have
slowed in 1987, but the outflow exceeded the inflow by nearly $1.2 billion in 1988
and $1.7 billion in the first half of 1989 alone. Data from Central Bank and Gazeta
Mercantil, Sept. 1, 1989 at 26.
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problems presently confronting Brazil. Brazil has to control its gal-
loping inflation rate, and that this will entail sharply reducing the
huge federal budgetary deficit. This requires dismantling the
bloated cartorial state, eliminating superfluous employees and ad-
ministrative organs. It also means selling off or liquidating ineffi-
cient and unproductive state enterprises whose deficits are drains on
the Treasury, and improving tax collection procedures. Most impor-
tantly, it means increasing the level of productive investment and
the productivity of Brazilian labor.
The Collor regime is making a valiant effort to deal seriously
with these major problems by slashing public employment, raising
taxes, eliminating subsidies, destroying cartels, liberating importa-
tion, and introducing a free market economy. Unfortunately, a
number of constitutional provisions pose serious obstacles to imple-
menting these important reforms. Without an economic system that
delivers more prosperity to the average Brazilian than is being cur-
rently delivered, the life of any constitution is likely to be short.
Thus far, the Executive and the Congress have shown they are
in no great hurry to implement substantial parts of the Constitution.
Congress itself has failed to pass much of the complementary and
implementing legislation called for by the 1988 Constitution, ignor-
ing the time periods for enacting such legislation set by the Consti-
tution itself. The most enduring contributions to constitutionalism
likely to result from Brazil's recent adventure in legislative constitu-
tion-drafting are its articulation of new and important constitutional
rights and its creation of new procedural devices for implementing
these rights. Hopefully, the 1993 revision will result in retention of
the Constitution's good features, which are plentiful, and the jet-
tisoning of its bad features, which are unfortunately also plentiful.
